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CUTTING THE FINANCIAL FAT FROM THE
FAILING FIRM DEFENSE:
REFOCUSING THE FAILING FIRM
DEFENSE ON ANTITRUST LAW
KYLE DIGANGI†
INTRODUCTION
Firms in danger of failure often hope to sell their assets to a
more financially stable entity. Sometimes such sales occur in the
context of bankruptcy.1 However, antitrust law often stands in
the way of these transactions when the sale is anticompetitive.
This is because Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers
and acquisitions that may substantially lessen competition,
regardless of a firm’s financial condition.2
Instead,
anticompetitive sales are permissible only when the
requirements of the “failing firm defense” are met. The failing
firm defense creates a narrow exception for failing firms to
complete an acquisition that would otherwise violate the
antitrust laws.
The failing firm defense allows an otherwise anticompetitive
merger to go forward if the firm being acquired is “failing”
according to antitrust law. Failing in an antitrust sense does not
mean losing money alone.3 Rather, to be considered failing in
antitrust, a firm must meet the following conditions: (1) the firm
†
Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2012, St. John’s
University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Keith Sharfman for all his
hard work, dedication and guidance during this Note writing process. I would also
like to thank my family and friends for all of their support.
1
Under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, Section 363(b) states that
“[t]he trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the
ordinary course of business, property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(b)(1) (West
2011).
2
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (West 2011).
3
Carl Shapiro, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. for Econ., Antitrust Div., Remarks
on Competition Policy in Distressed Industries 21 (May 13, 2009),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/245857.htm [hereinafter Remarks by
Shapiro].
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is “unable to pay its bills in the near future”; (2) the “firm could
not successfully reorganize in bankruptcy”; (3) “the firm has tried
to sell itself to someone else, in a combination that will not lessen
competition as much”; and (4) “the firm’s assets will exit the
[relevant] market” “without the acquisition.”4 The doctrine is
principally founded upon the rationale that “if a firm is failing,
then on balance it may be better to allow” a merger with a
competitor “than to watch” its “assets leave the market and be
unavailable to any competitor.”5 This Note argues that the third
and fourth elements are essential to proving the failing firm
defense, while showing that the first and second elements are
neither necessary nor consistent with antitrust law.
The most widely accepted version of the failing firm defense
is the form adopted by the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission (“Antitrust Regulators”)6 in the Horizontal
For almost twenty years, the 1992
Merger Guidelines.7
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“1992 Merger Guidelines”)
articulated a rigid test for using the failing firm defense that
required not only that a firm be financially distressed, but also
that there be no alternative purchasers and that the firm’s assets
would exit the relevant market absent the acquisition.8 Although
Antitrust Regulators might not have intended for the failing firm
defense to be analyzed differently, the 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines9 (“2010 Merger Guidelines”; “1992 Merger Guidelines”
and “2010 Merger Guidelines,” collectively “Horizontal Merger
Guidelines”) may have loosened the stringent requirements of
the 1992 Merger Guidelines. The 2010 version of the failing firm
defense deemphasizes the importance of the “assets exiting the
relevant market” requirement by changing it from an
4
J. Bruce McDonald, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., Remarks on
Antitrust for Airlines 8 (Nov. 3, 2005), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
speeches/217987.htm.
5
Id.
6
Hereinafter, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission
will be referred to as the “Antitrust Regulators.”
7
See Troy Paredes, Note, Turning the Failing Firm Defense into a Success: A
Proposal to Revise the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 347, 352–53
(1996) (providing an overview of the failing firm defense).
8
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, 41,563 (Sept. 10,
1992).
9
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES 1 n.1 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/
hmg-2010.pdf [hereinafter 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES].

WF_DiGangi (Do Not Delete)

2012]

CUTTING THE FINANCIAL FAT

12/7/2012 8:31 AM

279

independent element to an element that is automatically
satisfied if three other elements are met.10
If Antitrust
Regulators do not analyze separately whether a firm’s assets
would exit the relevant market, it would be easier for firms only
in financial distress to use the failing firm defense.
Recent years have witnessed a trend towards making it
easier for financially distressed firms to use the failing firm
defense in bankruptcy. Although transactions in bankruptcy are
likely to raise failing firm issues,11 bankruptcy is not enough to
invoke the failing firm defense. Today, the Antitrust Regulators’
primary, and often exclusive, reliance on the target firm’s
balance sheet and income statement to determine whether a firm
is failing is due to a misunderstanding of the failing firm
defense.12 Failing financially is not the same as failing in the
antitrust sense because being unable to pay bills in the shortterm and being unable to reorganize in bankruptcy are
bankruptcy elements that do not impact antitrust law, which
focuses on the protection of competition and consumers.13 The
failing firm defense should rely heavily on the assets exiting the
relevant market requirement and the alternative purchaser
requirement because they are the only elements that concern
antitrust law. Thus, a firm failing financially in bankruptcy
cannot automatically use the failing firm defense.
This Note proposes that the failing firm defense be
strengthened to an “Assets Exiting Defense,”14 which would allow
an otherwise anticompetitive merger to go forward only if there
are no other alternative purchasers that would make the
acquisition less anticompetitive and if the target firm’s assets
would exit the relevant market without the acquisition. A
stronger “Assets Exiting Defense” that focuses exclusively on
antitrust principles is necessary because in a distressed economy,

10

See infra Section I.
See Bernard A. Nigro, Jr. & Jonathan S. Kanter, The Effect of Market
Conditions on Merger Review—Distressed Industries, Failing Firms, and Mergers
with Bankrupt Companies, A.B.A. ANNUAL SPRING MEETING 7–8 (Apr. 2, 2003),
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-committees/attelecom/pdf/distressedindustry.pdf.
12
See Paredes, supra note 7, at 375.
13
See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977).
14
The “exiting assets” defense was first suggested by John Kwoka and Frederick
Warren-Boulton. See John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Frederick R. Warren-Boulton,
Efficiencies, Failing Firms, and Alternatives to Merger: A Policy Synthesis, 31
ANTITRUST BULL. 431, 446 (1986).
11
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the current failing firm defense could become an escape hatch for
anticompetitive transactions involving firms that are only in
financial distress. This Note argues that the assets exiting the
market requirement is crucial for antitrust purposes, that the
requirement has not been consistently considered by Antitrust
Regulators, and that removing it from the list of elements in the
2010 merger guidelines makes the failing firm defense easier to
use by firms only in financial distress. Part I provides an
overview of the failing firm defense and its history. Part II
explains the conceptual underpinnings of the failing firm defense
and how the elements of the defense have been analyzed. Part
III examines the application of the 1992 Merger Guidelines
version of the failing firm defense in the Trans World Airlines
(“TWA”) merger with American Airlines and the future
application of the defense after the newly created 2010 Merger
Guidelines. This Part concludes that Antitrust Regulators have
been allowing firms that are only financially distressed to use the
defense, as opposed to firms that are failing in the antitrust
sense. Part IV proposes using an “Assets Exiting Defense” to
replace the current failing firm defense. An “Assets Exiting
Defense” would ensure that Antitrust Regulators focus
exclusively on antitrust principles and do not apply the defense
too broadly to include anticompetitive transactions involving
firms only in financial distress. The purpose of the defense
should be to protect competition, not to protect firms from failing
in a distressed economy.
I.

OVERVIEW OF THE FAILING FIRM DOCTRINE

The failing firm defense is only considered if the prima facie
case
shows
that
the
transaction
is
presumptively
anticompetitive.15
“The failing firm doctrine permits an
otherwise anticompetitive merger or acquisition if the” defendant
or proponent of the merger can demonstrate that the acquired
firm would fail absent the transaction.16 It was judicially created

15

See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 273 (3d ed. 2009).
16
See Paredes, supra note 7, at 352.
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in the 1930 Supreme Court decision International Shoe Co. v.
Federal Trade Commission17 in a famous and oft-quoted passage,
where Justice Sutherland wrote:
In the light of the case thus disclosed of a corporation with
resources so depleted and the prospect of rehabilitation so
remote that it faced the grave probability of a business failure
with resulting loss to its stockholders and injury to the
communities where its plants were operated, we hold that the
purchase of its capital stock by a competitor (there being no
other prospective purchaser), not with a purpose to lessen
competition, but to facilitate the accumulated business of the
purchaser and with the effect of mitigating seriously injurious
consequences otherwise probable, is not in contemplation of law
prejudicial to the public and does not substantially lessen
competition or restrain commerce within the intent of the
Clayton Act.18

“The grave probability of a business failure” language is not
only the first articulation of the defense, but also led to the
development of a two-prong test that was confirmed in United
States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc.19 in 1971 and in United
States v. General Dynamics Corp.20 in 1974.21 The Court in
Greater Buffalo Press said that in order to be considered failing, a
firm must show “(1) that the resources of [the company] were ‘so
depleted and the prospect of rehabilitation so remote that it faced
the grave possibility of a business failure’ and (2) that there was
no other prospective purchaser for it.”22 The Court determined
that “an acquisition that would otherwise violate the antitrust
laws may proceed if the acquired company is a failing firm.”23
Some courts have also added a third element: that the failing
firm could not be reorganized successfully.24 These elements
imply that the firm would “very likely disappear from” the

17

280 U.S. 291 (1930).
Id. at 302–03 (emphasis added).
19
402 U.S. 549, 555 (1971).
20
415 U.S. 486, 506–07 (1974).
21
This language is still used verbatim in describing the financial distress prong
of the failing firm test. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486,
507 (1974); United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 555 (1971);
Citizen Publ’g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 137 (1969).
22
402 U.S. at 555; see also Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. at 507.
23
See Joel G. Chefitz, A Tale of Two Mergers: American/TWA and
United/USAir, 14 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 215, 216 (2002).
24
See Citizen Publ’g Co., 394 U.S. at 138.
18
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relevant market unless the firm was rescued by a merger.25 After
the Supreme Court’s creation of the failing firm doctrine,
Congress also explicitly acknowledged the existence of the failing
firm defense for actions challenging otherwise unlawful mergers
or acquisitions.26
While the failing firm defense is well established in United
States case law and in Congress, “most merger work is done at
the agency level, with only a small percentage reaching the
courts.”27 After the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1976,28 the failing firm defense battleground has shifted
from the courtroom to pre-merger filings and investigations by
Antitrust Regulators.29 If in their pre-merger investigations,
which include efficiencies analysis and the technical expertise of

25

AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 283.
The Senate Report on the 1950 amendments to § 7 of the Clayton Act stated:
The argument has been made that the proposed bill, if passed, would have
the effect of preventing a company which is in a failing or bankrupt
condition from selling out. The committee are [sic] in full accord with the
proposition that any firm in such a condition should be free to dispose of its
stock or assets. The committee however, do [sic] not believe that the
proposed bill will prevent sales of this type. The judicial interpretation on
this point goes back many years and is abundantly clear. According to
decisions of the Supreme Court, the Clayton Act does not apply in
bankruptcy or receivership cases. Moreover, the Court has held, with
respect to this specific section, that a company does not have to be actually
in a state of bankruptcy to be exempt from its provisions; it is sufficient
that it is heading in that direction with the probability that bankruptcy
will ensue.
S. REP. NO. 81-1775, at 7 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4293, 4299; accord
H.R. REP. NO. 81-1191, at 6–7 (1949).
27
See Lauren N. Norris, The Failing Firm Defense (July 2010), available at
http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/1ae9fe1f-ab0e-49cb-8527-00ac4fc754e7/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/9c1d5211-abbf-4217-a7ea-0756cc43c192/
Norris_Failing FirmDefense.pdf.
28
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94435, §§ 201, 202, 90 Stat. 1383 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18,
and 28 U.S.C.), provides pre-merger filing requirements that vastly changed merger
law and practice. For a review of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act’s effect on merger
practice, see Joe Sims & Deborah P. Herman, The Effect of Twenty Years of HartScott-Rodino on Merger Practice: A Case Study in the Law of Unintended
Consequences Applied to Antitrust Legislation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 865, 866 (1997).
29
See Oliver Zhong, Note, The Failing Company Defense After the Commentary:
Let it Go, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 745, 747 (2008) (suggesting that the failing firm
defense should no longer be recognized).
26
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economists, Antitrust Regulators determine that the merger will
be unlawful according to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, they
will challenge the merger.30
Today, the most widely accepted version of the failing firm
defense is that created by the Antitrust Regulators in the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines.31
The Horizontal Merger
Guidelines were created to “outline how the federal agencies
evaluate the likely competitive impact of mergers and whether
those mergers comply with U.S. antitrust law.”32 The Horizontal
Merger Guidelines were adopted in 1968 and revised in 1982,
1984, 1992, and, most recently, 2010.33
Revisions in the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines are supposed to reflect changes in
enforcement policy.34 For eighteen years the 1992 Merger
Guidelines provided that:
A merger is not likely to create or enhance market power or
facilitate its exercise if the following circumstances are met:
(1) The allegedly failing firm would be unable to meet its
financial obligations in the near future; (2) it would not be able
to reorganize successfully under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Act; (3) it has made unsuccessful good-faith efforts to elicit
reasonable alternative offers of acquisition of the assets of the
failing firm that would both keep its tangible and intangible
assets in the relevant market and pose a less severe danger to
competition than does the proposed merger; and (4) absent the
acquisition, the assets of the failing firm would exit the relevant
market.35

After the 1992 Merger Guidelines were criticized for being so
narrowly defined,36 the failing firm defense was revised in 2010.
The revised guidelines appear to be the same as the 1992 Merger
30

See id.
See Paredes, supra note 7, at 352–53.
32
Cecelia M. Assam, Revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines Offer Glimpse of
Premerger Analysis by DOJ, FTC, 99 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 231, 231 (2010)
(internal quotiation marks omitted).
33
See id. at 232.
34
2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 1 n.1.
35
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, 41,563 (Sept. 10,
1992).
36
See Debra A. Valentine, Deputy Director, Horizontal Issues: What’s
Happening and What’s on the Horizon, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Dec. 8, 1995),
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/dvhorizontalissues.shtm; Edward O. Correia, ReExamining the Failing Company Defense, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 683, 691 (1996); J.
Bruce McDonald, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., Remarks on Antitrust
for Airlines 8 (Nov. 3, 2005), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/217987.htm.
31
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Guidelines, but the 2010 version of the failing firm defense does
not explicitly list the fourth element—that absent the
acquisition, the assets of the failing firm would exit the relevant
market. The 2010 Merger Guidelines provide:
The Agencies do not normally credit claims that the assets of the
failing firm would exit the relevant market unless all of the
following circumstances are met: (1) the allegedly failing firm
would be unable to meet its financial obligations in the near
future; (2) it would not be able to reorganize successfully under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act; and (3) it has made
unsuccessful good-faith efforts to elicit reasonable alternative
offers that would keep its tangible and intangible assets in the
relevant market and pose a less severe danger to competition
than does the proposed merger.37

While substantively the 1992 and the 2010 Merger
Guidelines appear similar, it appears that the 2010 version of the
failing firm defense does not require analyzing whether the
assets of a firm would exit the relevant market as a separate
element. Instead, the 2010 version seems to indicate that the
assets exiting the relevant market requirement is automatically
met so long as the three other elements are met.
This
interpretation would substantially loosen the strict requirements
of the 1992 Merger Guidelines because instead of analyzing all
four elements, Antitrust Regulators may now be implying that if
the first three elements are met, the assets exiting the relevant
market element is also fulfilled and need not be analyzed
separately.
While the wording in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines is
slightly different from the case law, the analysis of whether a
firm is failing is essentially the same.
Thus, Antitrust
Regulators and courts have strictly enforced the requirements of
the failing firm defense from the Horizontal Merger Guidelines
because the failing firm defense is widely believed to be an
absolute defense, ending all inquires into the transaction’s likely
anticompetitive effects.38 Because the failing firm defense may
37
2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 32 (emphasis
added).
38
See, e.g., Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up Cos. v. FTC, 991 F.2d 859, 864–65 (D.C. Cir.
1993); FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1220 n.28 (11th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 673 n.24 (9th Cir. 1990); Mich. Citizens for an
Indep. Press v. Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1989), aff’d by an equally
divided court, 493 U.S. 38 (1989); Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279, 280
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allow an anticompetitive merger or acquisition, the burden of
proof falls on the defendant or proponent of the merger to prove
all of the elements.39
“[I]t is not surprising that the failing firm defense has
become well-established in antitrust law” because “mergers and
acquisitions often involve firms that are financially weak.”40
Because firms that are financially weak usually file for
bankruptcy, it is no wonder why the failing firm defense is often
raised in bankruptcy. However, the defense should focus solely
on antitrust principles and should not be applied too broadly to
include anticompetitive transactions involving firms only in
financial distress. The purpose of the defense should be to
protect competition, not to protect firms from failing in a
distressed economy.
II. CONCEPTUAL UNDERPINNINGS
Antitrust Regulators analyze four main elements when
applying the failing firm defense. Part II of this Note explains
how each element of the failing firm defense is analyzed and
briefly examines the approaches used by bankruptcy courts and
Antitrust Regulators when reviewing offers for a failing
company. Part II.A through II.D will provide an in-depth
analysis of each element of the failing firm defense. Part II.E
examines the standards used by Antitrust Regulators and the
bankruptcy courts when reviewing offers for a failing company
through Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up Companies, Inc. v. Federal Trade
Commission.41 The facts of Dr. Pepper show that a firm can be
failing financially in bankruptcy, but still not meet all the
requirements necessary for the failing firm defense because two
of the elements do not focus on bankruptcy at all.

(3d Cir. 1961); FTC v. Harbour Grp. Invs., Civ. A. No. 90-2525, 1990 WL 198819, at
*2 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 19, 1990); Joseph Ciccone & Sons, Inc. v. Eastern Indus., 537 F.
Supp. 623, 628 (E.D. Pa. 1982); United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 95 (D.
Colo. 1975); United States v. Md. & Va. Milk Producers Ass’n, 167 F. Supp. 799, 808
(D.D.C. 1958), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
39
See Paredes, supra note 7, at 353.
40
Id. at 354.
41
798 F. Supp. 762 (D.D.C. 1992).
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A.

The Inability To Meet Financial Obligations in the Near
Future Requirement

First, the failing firm defense requires the allegedly failing
firm to prove that it is unable to meet its financial obligations in
the near future. There is no checklist to determine if a firm
cannot meet its financial obligations in the near future.42 This
requirement must be carefully analyzed on a case-by-case basis.43
However, “negative current profits” or “a decline in sales” are
“insufficient to demonstrate that a firm would be unable to meet
its financial obligations” in the near future.44 The main concern
when determining whether a firm can meet its financial
obligations is whether the firm has sufficient cash flow.45 Other
factors that Antitrust Regulators consider include:
1) Whether a company’s costs are greater than its
revenue46
2) Whether total liabilities exceed total assets over a
period of time47
3) Whether a company’s short term losses are likely to be
repeated48
4) Whether a company has the ability “to obtain new
revenues or . . . customers”49
5) Whether the company’s “productivity is declining”50
6) Whether the “supply of key inputs . . . is being
exhausted”51
7) Whether the company is being run poorly by current
management52
8) Whether a company’s financial problems are part of
“an irreversible downward trend”53
42
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., POLICY ROUNDTABLES: THE
FAILING FIRM DEFENCE 2009 177 (2009), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/27/
45810821.pdf [hereinafter THE FAILING FIRM DEFENCE].
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
THE FAILING FIRM DEFENCE, supra note 42, at 177.
46
Id.
47
See California v. Sutter Health Sys., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1134–35 (N.D. Cal.
2001).
48
See KEN HEYER & SHELDON KIMMEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS GROUP
DISCUSSION PAPER: MERGER REVIEW OF FIRMS IN FINANCIAL DISTRESS 4–6 (2009),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/eag/244098.pdf.
49
THE FAILING FIRM DEFENCE, supra note 42, at 177.
50
See HEYER & KIMMEL, supra note 48, at 4.
51
Id.
52
Id.

WF_DiGangi (Do Not Delete)

2012]

12/7/2012 8:31 AM

CUTTING THE FINANCIAL FAT

287

9) Whether the firm is more attributable to the “general,
and temporary, depressed state of the economy”54
10) “[W]hether the company’s pre-merger, ordinary course
of business documents reveal an imminent financial
failure, or if the claims of failure appear to be invented
to help defend the merger”55
None of these factors is determinative, but antitrust
regulators will consider them when analyzing whether the firm is
unable to meet financial obligations in the near future. Because
being unable to meet financial obligations in the near future
focuses solely on whether a firm is financially distressed, this
element by itself has no implication on antitrust law.
B.

The Inability To Reorganize in Bankruptcy Requirement

Second, the failing firm defense requires that the allegedly
failing firm prove that it is unable to reorganize in bankruptcy.56
To determine whether a company is unable to reorganize in
bankruptcy, antitrust regulators consider “whether the
elimination of the company’s debt through a bankruptcy
proceeding could correct the company’s financial problems.”57
53

THE FAILING FIRM DEFENCE, supra note 42, at 177.
Id.
55
Id. at 177–78.
56
THE FAILING FIRM DEFENCE, supra note 42, at 178 n.23 (2009).
[U]nder Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1116,
any company may initiate a bankruptcy reorganization proceeding. Once it
files its reorganization petition, the company continues to operate, typically
under the control of current management, and is given a wide variety of
statutory powers to cancel or renegotiate contracts, use collateral to borrow
additional funds, rescale its operations, and modify its debt and equity
structure. Creditors may not initiate legal action against the company
outside the bankruptcy process. Ultimately, the company will propose a
plan of reorganization to keep its business alive and pay creditors over
time. The court must approve the plan, and certain debts incurred prior to
the filing of the bankruptcy petition will be discharged. The turnaround
period may involve years of operation in Chapter 11 reorganization, until
an economically viable business can be assured. If no feasible
reorganization plan can be formulated, then, under a Chapter 7 liquidation
proceeding, the assets of the company may be liquidated by a trustee, and
the proceeds distributed pursuant to the priorities set forth in Chapter 7 of
the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–716.
54

Id.
57
See id. at 178; see also United States v. Reed Roller Bit Co., 274 F. Supp. 573,
584 (W.D. Okla. 1967) (finding that although a company’s poor performance made it
an unattractive subsidiary, “it was not near bankruptcy, and it does not appear that
it would have been in the absence of merger”).
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“[R]eorganization may not be possible” if “the company is unable
to meet its current and expected operating expenses from its
expected revenues, or [if its] capital has been exhausted.”58
Antitrust Regulators will also “consider the company’s
projections for improving its condition and whether the company
has a viable plan going forward.”59 A company’s decision to
liquidate is not enough to create a failing firm situation unless
the company’s economic condition is beyond the prospect of
liquidation.60
Antitrust Regulators may also “talk to the
company’s creditors to determine whether they can or will work
out a plan to restructure the company’s debts.”61 If a company’s
future prospects are promising, creditors may be willing to
restructure loans, or loan additional funds to keep it in
business.62 Because being unable to reorganize in bankruptcy
focuses solely on whether a firm is financially distressed, this
element by itself does not concern antitrust law.
C.

The No Alternative Purchaser Less Detrimental to
Competition Requirement

Third, the failing firm defense requires that the allegedly
failing firm prove that there are no other reasonable alternatives
less detrimental to competition. The Supreme Court has stated
that “[t]he failing company doctrine plainly cannot be applied in
a merger or in any other case unless it is established that the
company that acquires the failing company or brings it under
dominion is the only available purchaser.”63 Courts interpreting
this requirement describe its burden as “quite heavy,”64 and hold
litigants asserting the defense to a showing that good faith
efforts were made to find an alternative purchaser.65 The
guidelines state that “[a]ny offer to purchase the assets of the
failing firm for a price above the liquidation value of those assets

58

See THE FAILING FIRM DEFENCE, supra note 42, at 178.
Id.
60
See Reed Roller Bit Co., 274 F. Supp. at 584 (citing Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v.
FTC, 291 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1961)).
61
THE FAILING FIRM DEFENCE, supra note 42, at 178.
62
See HEYER & KIMMEL, supra note 48, at 6.
63
Citizen Publ’g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1969) (emphasis
added).
64
FTC v. Harbour Grp. Invs., Civ. A. No. 90-2525, 1990 WL 198819, at *3
(D.D.C. Nov. 19, 1990) (citing Citizen Publ’g Co., 394 U.S. at 138).
65
See id. at *3, *6.
59
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will be regarded as a reasonable alternative.”66 Additionally, the
alternative purchaser should appear willing and able to keep the
assets operating in the market in order to be preferred over the
competitor.67 Antitrust Regulators might also “require a less
anticompetitive purchaser, even if it offers a lower price than the
proposed” merger.68
Determining whether a company sufficiently pursued
alternative purchasers can be difficult. Antitrust Regulators
require that the assets of the allegedly failing company be
“shopped” before determining that a company is entitled to the
failing firm defense.69 This sends a “signal to prospective sellers
that the search must be thorough and genuine.”70 Requiring a
genuine effort to find an alternative purchaser ensures that there
is “a good picture of the prospects for another buyer” by the time
the proposed merger reaches the stage of review by Antitrust
Regulators.71 The nature and size of the relevant market will
determine the scope of the “shopping.”72 Antitrust Regulators
require: (1) that a number and variety of companies be contacted,
including investment groups or companies from related
industries,” (2) that sufficient information be provided to
companies expressing interest,” and (3) “that legitimate
expressions of interest be pursued seriously.”73

66
67

2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 32 n.16.
See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, 41,563 (Sept. 10,

1992).
68
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS:
UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST ISSUES 282 (3d ed. 2008).
69
See HEYER & KIMMEL, supra note 48, at 5.
70
Correia, supra note 36, at 693. Cases such as FTC v. Harbour Group
Investments L.P., 1990 WL 198819 (D.D.C. 1990), which resulted in a preliminary
injunction because of an inadequate search, make the point well. See also Olin Corp.
v. FTC, 986 F.2d 1295, 1307 (9th Cir. 1993) (requiring a search for an alternative
purchaser even though assets would have exited the market in the absence of
merger).
71
See Correia, supra note 36, at 693–94.
72
THE FAILING FIRM DEFENCE, supra note 42, at 179. For example, “contact[ing]
only a few purchasers when the relevant market was small and unattractive to
potential purchasers,” and requiring many purchasers when the relevant market
was large and more attractive to potential purchasers, are factors that determine
the scope of “shopping.” Id. n.29.
73
See THE FAILING FIRM DEFENCE, supra note 42, at 179.
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The burden is on the defendant or proponent of the merger to
demonstrate that there are no reasonable alternative purchasers
less detrimental to competition.74 Antitrust Regulators are not
obligated to find another willing purchaser.75 However, the fact
that Antitrust Regulators “cannot . . . find another interested
purchaser may be persuasive evidence that the merging firm’s
unsuccessful ‘shop’ was adequate.”76 General expressions of
interest from alternative purchasers do not constitute reasonable
alternative offers, unless there are extensions of an actual offer.77
Because finding an alternative purchaser less detrimental to
competition affects competition, this element directly concerns
antitrust law.
D. The Assets Exiting the Relevant Market Requirement
Lastly, the failing firm defense requires that, absent the
acquisition, the assets of the firm would exit the relevant market.
Should that occur, then “by definition [the firm’s] assets would be
providing no competitive [re]straint [on] the market at all.”78
Simply showing that no alternative purchaser can be found does
not prove “that the allegedly failing firm would itself liquidate
rather than continue to operate the assets in the [relevant]
market.”79 Because the evidence given to Antitrust Regulators
“often rests largely in the hands of the allegedly failing firm,” “it
can be difficult to determine whether the assets would exit the
market.”80
The allegedly failing firm should be able to provide Antitrust
Regulators with “objective evidence sufficient to show that it is
not more profitable for it to continue to operate the assets in the
market than to have them employed elsewhere—such
as
81
through liquidation.”
Some courts require evidence that the
firm made a decision to close its business in the near future.82
The fact that a firm with market power offers to buy it might be
74

See Paredes, supra note 7, at 353.
THE FAILING FIRM DEFENCE, supra note 42, at 179.
76
Id.
77
See California v. Sutter Health Sys., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1137 (N.D. Cal.
2001); United States v. Culbro Corp., 504 F. Supp. 661, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
78
HEYER & KIMMEL, supra note 48, at 6.
79
See THE FAILING FIRM DEFENCE, supra note 42, at 179.
80
See id.
81
See id.
82
Olin Corp. v. FTC, 986 F.2d 1295, 1307 (9th Cir. 1993).
75
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“evidence that its assets are in certain ways useful.”83 If a firm’s
assets still have value they will likely not leave the market
absent the acquisition and therefore the failing firm defense
would not apply. Because determining whether a firm would exit
the relevant market affects competition, this element has strong
antitrust implications.
E.

The Different Standards Used by Antitrust Regulators and
Bankruptcy Courts When Reviewing Offers for a Failing
Firm

Bankruptcy alone is not enough to invoke the failing firm
defense. A firm in bankruptcy is financially distressed, but that
only satisfies the first two elements of the failing firm defense.
The confusion arises from the fact that being unable to pay
obligations in the near future and unable to reorganize
successfully (“bankruptcy elements”) concern bankruptcy,
whereas the alternative purchaser requirement and assets
exiting the relevant market requirement (“antitrust elements”)
concern antitrust law.
The inherent conflict between the
bankruptcy elements and the antitrust elements makes the
failing firm defense, as it currently stands, problematic for
Antitrust Regulators and bankruptcy courts.
Antitrust Regulators and bankruptcy courts use very
different standards when reviewing offers for a failing firm.84
“[A]ntitrust [R]egulators tend to favor the deal that best protects
competition and keeps assets in service, even if that means
creditors reclaim less money.”85 On the other hand, bankruptcy
courts “usually favor the offer that returns the most money to the
company’s creditors and other stakeholders, unless there is clear
evidence that the deal would violate the antitrust laws.”86
The inherent conflict between the bankruptcy elements
and the antitrust elements of the failing firm defense
makes it difficult for bankruptcy courts to determine what
evidence would clearly show violation of the antitrust laws.
In Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up Companies, Inc. v. Federal Trade

83

See Zhong, supra note 29, at 772.
See Charles Sisk, Rival Bids Imperil AMR Deal for TWA, DAILY DEAL (Feb.
14, 2001), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005527280&hbxlogin=1.
85
Id.
86
Id.
84
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Commission,87 the owner of Canada Dry Bottling Company of
New York and Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of New York, Inc.
acquired Seven-Up Brooklyn’s soft drink franchises.88 Seven-Up
Brooklyn had been “financially troubled for many years” until it
filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11.89
The
bankruptcy court issued an order finding that “Seven-Up
Brooklyn was a failed business unable ‘to recommence operations
or continue in its normal course of business,’ ” and that the deal
for the owner of Canada Dry Bottling Company and Pepsi Cola
Bottling Company of New York “to acquire Seven-Up Brooklyn
was ‘the only proposal that might provide for distribution to the
unsecured creditors or the estate, even with the FTC approval
process taken into consideration.’ ”90 Conversely, when the FTC
challenged the acquisition in the district court, the court found
that it was clear from the record that the FTC could rationally
conclude that Seven-Up Brooklyn had failed to meet the
requirements of the failing firm doctrine.91 The court held that
Seven-Up had failed to establish that the proposed purchaser of
Seven-Up Brooklyn’s soft drink franchises was the “only
available purchaser” and rejected the merger.92 The district
court acknowledged that although the company was bankrupt
and had met the first two requirements of the failing firm
defense, it did not meet the antitrust elements and, therefore,
could not take advantage of the defense.93
Dr. Pepper shows that a firm can be failing financially in
bankruptcy, but still not meet all the requirements necessary for
the failing firm defense.94 Failing financially is insufficient, as a
matter of law, to sanction a merger shown by other evidence to be
likely to lessen competition.95 This is because a firm’s financial
failings have essentially no effect on its competitive position in

87

798 F. Supp. 762 (D.D.C. 1992).
See id. at 764.
89
See id. at 765.
90
Id. at 778–79.
91
Id. at 779.
92
Id.
93
See id. at 778–79.
94
See United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 296 F. Supp. 994, 1003 (E.D. Wis.
1969) (finding that even though the defendants “were in a very serious, even
precarious, financial position at the time of the merger,” they nonetheless “failed to
satisfy their burden of proving the material elements of the failing firm defense”).
95
See Kwoka & Warren-Boulton, supra note 14, at 450.
88
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the relevant market.96 In fact, a firm in bankruptcy “may remain
in business indefinitely although it fails to cover total costs.”97
Thus, “impending [financial] failure does not necessarily mean
that a firm would in fact disappear from the market without the
particular merger in question.”98
III. PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE FAILING FIRM DEFENSE
A recession causes many firms to experience financial
distress. Naturally, there are likely to be more bankruptcies
during a recession than in years when the economy is stronger.99
A bankruptcy sale is often the “exit strategy of choice for
distressed companies and their suitors.”100 Bankruptcy sales also
tend to raise failing firm issues.101
Given the state of the economy, much merger and acquisition
activity in the near future may involve companies in dire
financial straits, raising the issue of whether antitrust regulators
will be more sympathetic to the acquisition of failing firms.102
“[T]here was speculation that the failing firm defense would be
invoked more often and [that antitrust regulators] would relax
the defense’s stringent requirements.”103
If the defense is
relaxed, some firms might attempt to use poor economic
conditions as a way to secure approval of what would otherwise
be judged an anticompetitive merger.104

96

See Zhong, supra note 29, at 772.
G.E. Hale & Rosemary D. Hale, Failing Firms and the Merger Provisions of
the Antitrust Laws, 52 KY. L.J. 597, 601 (1964).
98
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 275.
99
See Remarks by Shapiro, supra note 3, at 13. Between 2007 and 2008, about
35,000 firms filed for bankruptcy. See Business and Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Cases
Commenced, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, During the Twelve Month Period
Ended
Sept.
30,
2008,
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2008/0908_f2.pdf;
Business
and
Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Cases Commenced, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code,
During the Twelve Month Period Ended Sept. 30, 2007, http://www.uscourts.
gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2007/0907_f2.xls.
This data includes bankruptcies leading to both liquidations and reorganizations.
The number of bankruptcies rose from about 26,000 in 2007 to about 39,000 in 2008.
100
See Ryan K. Cochran, et. al., Antitrust Concerns May Block Section 363 Sales
Bankruptcy Court Orders May Not Be as Bulletproof as They Seem (May 14, 2009),
http://www.turnaround.org/publications/articles.aspx?objectID=10957.
101
See Nigro & Kanter, supra note 11, at 11.
102
See Remarks by Shapiro, supra note 3, at 20.
103
See Norris, supra note 27.
104
See Remarks by Shapiro, supra note 3, at 20.
97
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Part III of this Note explores how the 1992 version of the
failing firm defense has been applied by antitrust regulators in a
proposed bankruptcy merger, and how the failing firm defense
may be applied after the new 2010 Merger Guidelines.
Specifically, this section analyzes how antitrust regulators
interpreting the failing firm defense have been deemphasizing
the importance of the antitrust elements of the failing firm
defense, thereby allowing firms that are only financially
distressed to use the defense. Part III.A explores the TWA and
American Airlines merger and illustrates how the failing firm
defense has been misapplied by antitrust regulators to allow
firms that are only financially distressed to use the failing firm
defense. Part III.B explores how the 2010 Merger Guidelines will
likely be interpreted by antitrust regulators and how the new
guidelines might make it easier for firms which are failing
financially to use the failing firm defense.
A.

Application of the 1992 Version of the Failing Firm Defense
in the TWA and American Airlines Merger

One of the leading sources of the failing firm confusion was
the TWA and American Airlines merger. The highly publicized
merger proved that the failing firm defense was “alive and
well,”105 but also that antitrust regulators are putting too much
emphasis on bankruptcy to prove the defense. This section
analyzes the TWA and American Airlines merger, the antitrust
regulators’ rationale for allowing the merger, and the bankruptcy
test antitrust regulators used, which resulted in a misapplication
of the 1992 version of the failing firm defense.
1.

Factual Background of the TWA and American Airlines
Merger

In early 2001, the plan for American Airlines to acquire the
critically ailing TWA was confirmed after successful use of the
failing firm defense.106 “TWA was in dire financial straits and
American Airlines appeared to be its only and last financial hope
before it succumbed to liquidation.”107 At the time, American
Airlines was already the second-largest U.S. airline carrier, while

105
106
107

Chefitz, supra note 23, at 219.
See id.
Bensel v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 675 F. Supp. 2d 493, 494–95 (D.N.J. 2009).
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TWA was the eighth-largest.108 According to the deal, American
agreed “to pay approximately $500 million for about 190 TWA
aircraft, 175 gates, and 173 slots across the country.”109 As part
of the arrangement, TWA filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection from creditors.110 This marked the third time that
cash-strapped TWA had filed for bankruptcy protection.111
TWA’s bankruptcy filing sharply increased pressure on
Antitrust Regulators to approve the deal because allegedly no
other buyers had expressed interest and “TWA [was] one way or
another going to disappear as a corporate entity.”112 Supporters
of the merger looked at the deal not as a merger, but as a “rescue
mission,” because “TWA [could not] be saved without America’s
help.”113 The proponents focused primarily on saving jobs rather
than the competitive consequences of the deal.114 Critics of the
merger said that the deal was “unchecked airline arrogance and
blatant disregard for the principles of competition.”115 Those
opposing the merger were concerned that the deal would leave
two dominant airlines in the U.S. air travel industry116 that
would lead to higher airfares for consumers.117
2.

Antitrust Regulators Misapplied the 1992 Version of the
Failing Firm Defense Because TWA Was Only Failing
Financially

Antitrust Regulators allowed the TWA and American
Airlines merger to go forward without challenge although TWA
was only financially distressed. TWA was able to use the failing
108
See Brian Knowlton, TWA’s Farewell Will Radically Alter U.S. Airline
Market, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2001, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/
11/news/11iht-twa.2.t_1.html?pagewanted=print.
109
Tim Johnson & Kim Khan, AMR Takes TWA Aboard, CNN MONEY (Jan. 10,
2001), http://money.cnn.com/2001/01/10/deals/amr_twa/. See also Jim Abrams,
Congress Weighs American-TWA Merger Fallout, ABC NEWS (Feb. 1, 2001),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=94229&page=1.
110
See Johnson & Khan, supra note 109; see also Knowlton, supra note 108.
111
“TWA filed its first chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in 1992. It filed its second
chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in 1995. TWA filed . . . its third chapter 11
bankruptcy [petition] on January 10, 2001.” In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 0100056(PJW), 2001 WL 1820326, at *2 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 2, 2001).
112
Johnson & Khan, supra note 109; Knowlton, supra note 108.
113
Abrams, supra note 109.
114
See id.; see also Johnson & Khan, supra note 109.
115
Johnson & Khan, supra note 109.
116
See id.; see also Abrams, supra note 109.
117
See Johnson & Khan, supra note 109; see also Knowlton, supra note 108.
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firm defense because Antitrust Regulators misapplied the
alternative purchaser and the assets exiting the relevant market
requirements. The bankruptcy court found:
TWA was and has been in dire financial straights [sic] for a
considerable period of time. It had no real prospect for a
standalone reorganization. This is TWA’s third chapter 11 case
in less than ten years and a sale of its business as a going
concern is its only real hope for significant recoveries for
significant segments of its creditor constituencies.118

In this case, Antitrust Regulators were more concerned with
the loss suffered by creditors instead of the potential loss of
competition.119 In doing so, Antitrust Regulators misapplied the
alternative purchaser requirement and the assets exiting the
relevant market requirement of the failing firm defense. These
two requirements are the only requirements that have antitrust
consequences.120 If Antitrust Regulators do not analyze the
antitrust elements of the failing firm defense correctly, there is a
risk that an anticompetitive merger will be approved wrongfully
because “the financial condition of a firm is neither necessary nor
sufficient” to use the failing firm defense.121 Loosening the strict
requirement that a firm meet each element of the failing firm
defense creates confusion in the doctrine. Although TWA was
financially distressed,122 it should not have been able to use the
failing firm defense because there were alternative purchasers
available and TWA’s assets would not have left the air
transportation market.

118

In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 01-00056(PJW), 2001 WL 1820326, at *7
(Bkrtcy. D. Del. 2001). “TWA has not earned a profit for over a decade” prior to the
bankruptcy proceedings; “[i]t incurred operating losses of $29.26 million in 1997,
$65.16 million in 1998, and $347.64 million in 1999.” Id. at *2.
119
See id. at *6–7.
120
See supra Part II.C–D.
121
See Kwoka & Warren-Boulton, supra note 14, at 450.
122
TWA showed that it was unable to meet its financial obligations in the near
future and that it likely could not reorganize in bankruptcy. In re Trans World
Airlines, 2001 WL 1820326, at *2 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001). TWA could not meet its
operating expenses and “[t]he airline had less than a day’s cash flow on hand at the
time of its bankruptcy filing.” Chefitz, supra note 23, at 223. Furthermore, “[TWA]
evaluated various options, some very severe options that might have permitted TWA
to survive as a going concern but as a scaled back airline” that were ultimately
unsuccessful. Id. at 222.
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Antitrust Regulators’ Misapplication of the Alternative
Purchaser Requirement

Antitrust Regulators found that there were no other
alternative purchasers. TWA was able to convince Antitrust
Regulators of a well-documented “shopping story” to other less
competitive purchasers in the pre-bankruptcy period.123 TWA
contacted airline buyers and several non-airline buyers that
might have an interest in purchasing TWA.124 TWA also
explored “combinations such as . . . partnerships, and other
strategic alliances.”125 Antitrust Regulators were also persuaded
by TWA’s evidence that “the solicitations of potential bidders
included a possible bankruptcy sale.”126 In the pre-bankruptcy
period, the advantages of a potential bankruptcy sale were
pointed out to all of the prospective purchasers that were
contacted.127 In post-bankruptcy, TWA was able to supplement
its pre-bankruptcy “shopping story” with an argument that there
were no viable purchasers available because they “suffered from
the same systemic deficiencies” that TWA faced, “and thus were
neither viable nor credible.”128
Antitrust Regulators misapplied the alternative purchaser
requirement. According to the 2010 Merger Guidelines, “[a]ny
offer to purchase the assets of the failing firm for a price above
the liquidation value of those assets will be regarded as a
reasonable alternative offer.”129 Here, a number of alternative
purchasers seemed to be available and sought opportunities to
submit meaningful bids.130 It is well-documented that Carl Icahn
submitted a competing bid for TWA and the bankruptcy court

123

Chefitz, supra note 23, at 223.
Id. at 222. “In their effort to find a strategic partner, TWA . . . approached
more than seven airlines, including Delta, Continental, United and U.S. Air.” In re
Trans World Airlines, 2001 WL 1820326, at *2.
125
Chefitz, supra note 23, at 222.
126
Id. at 223.
127
Id.
128
See In re Trans World Airlines, 2001 WL 1820326, at *8, *10; see also Chefitz,
supra note 23, at 223.
129
2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 32 n.16.
130
Once the deal was announced, Continental Airlines said it would pay
between $300 and $400 million for certain gates, slots and other assets, while Jet
Acquisitions said it had planned to offer nearly $1 billion to keep TWA “independent
and financially viable.” Sisk, supra note 84. Moreover, Northwest Airlines had said
it wanted TWA’s stake in Worldspan L.P., a reservation service. Id.
124
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rejected that proposal as not being a “viable” offer.131 Instead of
determining if the bid price was above the liquidation value,
Antitrust Regulators decided to look at whether the bids were
viable or meritorious.132
Antitrust Regulators, like the
bankruptcy court, determined that if competing bids would suffer
from the same systemic deficiencies that TWA suffered from, it
was not a valid offer.133 Evaluating whether an offer is viable
directly conflicts with the explicit wording of the 2010
Guidelines, which states “[a]ny offer . . . above the liquidation
value . . . will be regarded as a reasonable alternative offer.”134
This would also disregard the fact that it would defy reasonable
business judgment for a firm to make an offer that is not viable.
As a less detrimental alternative purchaser, Carl Icahn should
have been free to make structural changes to TWA or sell TWA’s
assets piecemeal, and his bid should have been accepted. Thus,
Antitrust Regulators misapplied the alternative purchaser
requirement to the failing firm defense.
b.

Antitrust Regulators’ Misapplication of the Assets Exiting
Requirement

Antitrust Regulators found that the assets-exiting-therelevant-market requirement was satisfied. TWA was able to
convince Antitrust Regulators that, “but for th[e] merger between
American and TWA and American’s assumption of [TWA’s] St.
Louis hub and some of the other markets and services offered by
TWA, many assets would exit the market [for consumer air
transportation in the United States] entirely.”135 TWA claimed
that the deal would preserve twenty thousand jobs and retiree
benefits that would otherwise be lost.136 Moreover, TWA claimed
that if it “were split up and . . . its assets were sold
piecemeal, . . . [the] hub in St. Louis would disappear” from the
air transportation market.137

131

See In re Trans World Airlines, 2001 WL 1820326, at *10.
See id.
133
See id.
134
2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 32 n.16 (emphasis
added).
135
Chefitz, supra note 23, at 224.
136
See In re Trans World Airlines, 2001 WL 1820326, at *3, *5.
137
Chefitz, supra note 23, at 224.
132
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Antitrust Regulators also misapplied the requirement that
the allegedly failing firm’s assets would have exited the relevant
market without the acquisition. If assets could be expected to
remain in the market in any way, “then acquisition of those
assets by a leading firm would raise conventional antitrust
concerns.”138 Here, TWA admits that it was only able to prove
that “many” assets would exit the air transportation market.139
This is not enough to prove that the assets of a firm would exit
the market absent the acquisition because there are assets that
would likely not exit the market.
First, TWA’s airplanes would not have exited the air
transportation market. A commercial airplane will not disappear
from the air transportation market because another airline or an
independent company that sells used airplanes and airplane
parts would purchase it. “If [a] firm owns important assets
whose value is greatest in their current use, these assets are
unlikely to exit the market, even if the firm cannot meet its
financial obligations in the near future.”140 Rather than exit,
productive assets like airplanes are likely to continue serving
their productive function.141 It follows that airplanes will not
“disappear from the face of the earth,” but will instead “fly until
they die.” 142 Thus, the airplanes from TWA would have been
used in the air transportation market by competitors who bought
airplanes piecemeal or by independent dealers who would sell
airplanes in the air transportation market had the merger not
taken place.
Second, TWA employees would not have all lost jobs and
disappeared from the air transportation market. There is no
reason to believe “that in any aggregate sense jobs are lost or
communities necessarily disrupted” when a firm fails
financially.143 If there are still productive assets like airplanes,
the assets will tend to continue to serve their productive function
and “continue to employ roughly as many people as they
employed before.”144 Thus, most of the former TWA employees
138

See Kwoka & Warren-Boulton, supra note 14, at 445.
Chefitz, supra note 23, at 224.
140
See Remarks by Shapiro, supra note 3, at 21.
141
See William F. Baxter, Remarks: The Failing Firm Doctrine, 50 ANTITRUST
L.J. 247, 249 (1982).
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
139
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would likely still be employed to support the airplanes that
would be used in the air transportation market by other
competitors. Even if some jobs were lost, not all twenty thousand
jobs would have disappeared and therefore exited the market.
3.

What Should Have Happened with the TWA and American
Airlines Merger

Because the TWA and American Airlines merger did not
satisfy all of the requirements of the failing firm defense, it
would have been preferable to allow TWA to fail and have its
assets more widely dispersed throughout the market.145 TWA’s
assets could have been poached piecemeal by smaller competitors
keeping those assets in the relevant market.146 While American
may have had sufficient resources to acquire TWA in its entirety,
“many competitors may have [had] the resources to acquire the
strategic assets” from TWA “that they value[d] the most.”147 The
bankruptcy court even stated, “[t]he sale of TWA as a going
concern avoided the most likely alternative, which was the
piecemeal liquidation of individual assets.”148 If TWA was “forced
to liquidate in a bankruptcy sale and sell its assets piecemeal to
the highest bidder, smaller competitors [might have] purchase[d]
and more productively use[d] [TWA’s] assets, which in turn
[would have] enabled them to compete away market share from
the market leader,” American Airlines.149 Moreover, smaller
competitors and new entrants might have benefitted from TWA’s
assets being sold piecemeal because they would be in a better
position to compete with American for TWA’s released
customers.150
B.

Potential Confusion From the Revised 2010 Merger
Guidelines

The 2010 Merger Guidelines have seemed to relax the
stringent requirements of the failing firm defense in the 1992
Merger Guidelines.
Revisions in the Horizontal Merger

145

See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 275–76.
See Johnson & Khan, supra note 109.
147
See Paredes, supra note 7, at 369–70.
148
In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 01-00056(PJW), 2001 WL 1820326, at *5
(Bkrtcy. D. Del. 2001).
149
See Paredes, supra note 7, at 369–70.
150
See id. at 370.
146
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Guidelines are supposed to reflect changes in enforcement
policy.151 The 2010 revisions will create much confusion in the
failing firm doctrine because they differ from the 1992 Merger
Guidelines on the interpretation of the assets-exiting-the
relevant-market requirement.152 This section will analyze the
difference between the 1992 and 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, and briefly explore why the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines should not be loosened in a distressed economy.
1.

Difference Between the 1992 and the 2010 Merger
Guidelines

The main difference between the 1992 and the 2010 Merger
Guidelines is that the 2010 Merger Guidelines do not explicitly
list as an element that absent the acquisition, the assets of the
failing firm would exit the relevant market.153 Instead, the 2010
Merger Guidelines say “[t]he Agencies do not normally credit
claims that the assets of the failing firm would exit the relevant
market” unless the firm is “unable to pay its financial obligations
in the near future,” “would not be able to reorganize
successfully,” and could not find an alternative purchaser that
would pose a less severe danger to competition.154 Although all of
the elements from the 1992 Merger Guidelines seem to be
present in the 2010 Merger Guidelines, there may be two
interpretations of the new guidelines.
One interpretation of the 2010 Merger Guidelines is that
nothing has changed. All of the elements seem to be included in
the guidelines and Antitrust Regulators may not change the way
they analyze the failing firm defense at all. Antitrust Regulators
may interpret the guidelines to mean that if the first three
elements are met, then Antitrust Regulators will take those
three elements into account when analyzing whether the assets
of the failing firm would exit the relevant market absent the
acquisition. If nothing has changed in the failing firm defense, it
is confusing why Antitrust Regulators changed the wording of
the 1992 Merger Guidelines.155

151
152
153
154
155

2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 1 n.1.
See supra Part I.
See supra Part I.
2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 32.
See supra Part I.
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Another more likely interpretation of the 2010 Merger
Guidelines is that the defense has changed significantly. While
substantively the 1992 and 2010 Merger Guidelines appear
similar, the change in wording alone signals that something is
different or else Antitrust Regulators would not have changed
the wording from the 1992 version.156 Antitrust Regulators may
interpret the guidelines to mean that the failing firm defense
does not require analyzing whether the assets of a firm would
exit the relevant market as a separate element. Instead,
Antitrust Regulators may determine that if the three elements in
the 2010 Guidelines are met, then the assets-exiting-therelevant-market element is automatically met.
This
interpretation would confirm the holding of the TWA case and
substantially loosen the strict requirements of the 1992 Merger
Guidelines because now one less requirement of the 1992 Merger
Guidelines needs to be met. More importantly, the assetsexiting-the-relevant-market requirement is an antitrust
element,157 which would tilt the balance of the failing firm
defense toward a bankruptcy application. If the assets-exitingthe-relevant-market requirement is not included in Antitrust
Regulators’ analysis, the defense only requires a firm failing
financially to prove that there is no alternative purchaser that is
less detrimental to competition. This would allow a firm to use
poor economic conditions as a way to secure approval of what
would otherwise be judged an anticompetitive merger.158
Because the Horizontal Merger Guidelines have been
“revised from time to time . . . to reflect changes in enforcement
policy [or] to clarify aspects of existing policy,”159 confusion has
occurred not just for lawyers, but for the courts as well. Even in
bad economic times, the “strict requirements” of the failing firm
defense “should not be loosened to address the circumstances of a
distressed [economy or] industry.”160 Critics of the 2010 Merger
Guidelines say that the guidelines are “neither a complete and
accurate description of what [the] enforcement staff considers in

156
157
158
159
160

See id.
See supra Part II.E.
Remarks by Shapiro, supra note 3, at 20.
2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 1 n.1.
See Nigro & Kanter, supra note 11, at 2.
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merger investigations, nor a helpful guide to courts.”161 Although
the purpose of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines is to “provide
more clarity and transparency,”162 they seem to have done the
opposite in regards to the failing firm defense.
2.

Applying the Failing Firm Defense in a Bad Economy

An economic downturn may lead to more proposed mergers
between financially distressed firms, but it does not imply that
looser standards ought to be applied when analyzing them.163
Firms that are losing money have to satisfy the conditions
demanded by the failing firm defense “even when the overall
economy is going through very difficult times.”164 Antitrust
Regulators should apply a rigorous failing firm defense during a
downturn because a recession can facilitate strong growth in
long-term productivity.165 An economic downturn tends to drive
out the less efficient market players, unlike a boom, where
inefficient players may not only survive, but grow.166
Antitrust Regulators “cannot and should not look the other
way when faced with practices or proposed combinations that
will harm competition and consumers in the long run.”167
Keeping markets competitive during hard economic times is no
less important than during normal economic times.168 “Although
a weak economy may mean that more transactions will pass
muster” under the failing firm defense, “those that do not should
be blocked in troubled economic times for the same reasons they

161
See Sheri Qualters, New Merger Guidelines Will Likely Lead to a More Fluid
Review Process, NAT’L L. J. (Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/
PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202470948967&slreturn=1. Conversely, Department of
Justice Antitrust Chief Christine Varney said that the guidelines “better reflect the
agencies’ actual practices,” and FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz “praised their ‘ clarity
and predictability.’ ” Jenna Greene, New Merger Guidelines Prompt Harsh Response
from FTC’s Rosch, THE BLT: THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Aug. 19, 2010, 4:08 PM),
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/08/new-merger-guidelines-prompt-harshresponse-from-ftcs-rosch.html.
162
Assam, supra note 32, at 231.
163
The same basic principles of antitrust economics apply during a recession as
apply during an economic expansion. See Remarks by Shapiro, supra note 3.
Additionally, the ultimate goals of the antitrust laws protecting competition and
consumers do not change during an economic downturn.
164
See HEYER & KIMMEL, supra note 48.
165
Remarks by Shapiro, supra note 3, at 18 n.34.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 17.
168
Id. at 2.
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should be blocked in more ‘normal’ times.”169 If not, “[there]
would be a reduction in competition and harm to consumers and
the economy as a whole.”170
While recessions are temporary, mergers can permanently
eliminate competitors.171 “[T]here is always harm from blocking
a merger that would have cut the costs of the firm that had been
failing.”172 “[B]ecause it is easier to redeploy assets in booming
times than in downturns,” “such a cost is relatively high during
an economic downturn.”173 Alternatively, “the cost of allowing a
merger to create market power is greater during a
downturn . . . since entry may be likelier during a boom.”174
Because of the high costs associated with rejecting a merger
during an economic downturn, Antitrust Regulators must
analyze the failing firm defense carefully and consistently.
IV. EXITING ASSETS DEFENSE
The change in the 2010 Merger Guidelines will lead to
continued problems for Antitrust Regulators when applying the
elements of the failing firm defense. Moreover, the 2010 Merger
Guidelines show that the defense is beginning to look more like a
bankruptcy test when the defense should instead be focused on
antitrust law. The fact that the failing firm defense continues to
create confusion indicates that some modifications to the 2010
Merger Guidelines are in order. The inquiry should not include
whether the target is failing financially. A failing firm defense
that focuses on financials ignores the more critical antitrust
questions. Because the failing firm defense is firmly engrained
in antitrust law, the defense should focus solely on antitrust
principles. Thus, an “Exiting Assets Defense” is needed to ensure
competitive markets and that the defense is applied consistently
by Antitrust Regulators.
Particularly in a time when Antitrust Regulators will be
faced with a large number of proposed mergers where the failing
firm defense may be offered, it is important to understand the
principles underlying the defense and the appropriate framework
169
170
171
172
173
174

HEYER & KIMMEL, supra note 48, at 1.
Id.
Remarks by Shapiro, supra note 3, at 15.
HEYER & KIMMEL, supra note 48, at 11.
Id.
Id.
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for analyzing merging firms in some form of financial distress.175
This Part proposes a three-step solution to the failing firm
defense confusion. Part IV.A discusses why it is necessary to
change the name of the failing firm defense to the “Exiting
Assets Defense.” Part IV.B explains why the failing firm defense
should remove the bankruptcy elements. Part IV.C explains why
the failing firm defense should only include the antitrust
elements of the defense. Finally, Part IV.D suggests how the
guidelines should be revised to include the “Exiting Assets
Defense.”
A.

Step 1 - Change the Name of the Failing Firm Defense to the
“Exiting Assets Defense”

The actual failing firm defense title should be changed to the
“Exiting Assets Defense.”176 It is perhaps more accurate to refer
to the failing firm defense as an “Exiting Assets Defense” because
“permitting [a] merger may . . . be anticompetitive” “[i]f the
assets would likely remain in the market—even if in the hands of
some other player.”177 Additionally, the defense will not apply
unless the assets-exiting-the-relevant-market requirement is
met.
The word “failing” also causes confusion. One definition of
“fail” is “to become bankrupt or insolvent.”178 Although this is
only one definition of the word “failing,” it explains why judges,
lawyers and even Antitrust Regulators believe that a firm in
bankruptcy can use the failing firm defense. Thus, simply
changing the name from the failing firm defense to the “Exiting
Assets Defense” would provide more clarity to the defense.
Moreover, the name change could lead to judicial economy
through less litigation on the failing firm defense issue.
Currently, the failing firm defense is often raised, but it is rarely
successful.179 Under the new “Exiting Assets Defense,” however,
175

Id. at 1.
In Olin Corp. v. FTC, 986 F.2d 1295, 1307 (9th Cir. 1993), Olin proposed the
use of an “exiting assets” defense. The court stated that “The key element of such a
defense is proof that, without the merger, the assets owned by the acquired firm
would shortly be leaving the market.” Id.
177
HEYER & KIMMEL, supra note 48, at 5.
178
Failing
Definition,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/fail?show=0&t=1287343247 (last visited Feb. 9, 2012).
179
The defense has proven successful in only a small number of court cases. See,
e.g., Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England Inc., 284 F.2d 582, 589–90
176
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lawyers would understand that the defense requires the assets of
the firm to exit the market rather than the firm to be merely
financially distressed.
A greater understanding of the
limitations of the defense will lead to less litigation on whether a
firm is failing.
B.

Step 2 - Remove the Bankruptcy Elements from the Failing
Firm Defense

The bankruptcy elements of the failing firm defense, which
focus on whether a firm is financially distressed, should be
removed from the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. A firm is
financially distressed if: (1) it is “unable to meet its financial
obligations in the near future” and (2) it is unable “to reorganize
[in bankruptcy] successfully.”180 These two elements of the
failing firm defense do not have any effect on antitrust law
because a firm’s financial failing has little impact on a firm’s
competitive position.181 Indeed, “[f]inancial weakness, while
perhaps relevant in some cases, is probably the weakest ground
of all for justifying a merger,” and “certainly cannot be the
primary justification” for permitting one.182 While being unable
to pay bills or to reorganize is often a precursor to a firm’s assets
potentially exiting the relevant market, financial distress alone is
not an antitrust defense.183 “It is, therefore, apparent that the
financial condition of a firm is neither necessary nor sufficient for
a per se defense for merger.”184
C.

Step 3 - Keep the Antitrust Elements from the Failing Firm
Defense

The failing firm defense should focus solely on the
requirements that have antitrust implications. The elements of
the failing firm defense that have an antitrust effect are: (1) the
alternative purchaser requirement and (2) the assets-exiting-the-

(1st Cir. 1960); California v. Sutter Health Sys., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1133 (N.D.
Cal. 2001); Reilly v. Hearst Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1205 (N.D. Cal. 2000); FTC
v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 528 F. Supp. 84, 96–98 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
180
2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 32.
181
See Zhong, supra note 29, at 772; see also supra Part II.A–B.
182
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. FTC, 652 F.2d 1324, 1339, 1341 (7th Cir.
1981).
183
See Remarks by Shapiro, supra note 3, at 19.
184
See Kwoka & Warren-Boulton, supra note 14, at 450.
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relevant-market requirement.185
Unlike the bankruptcy
elements of the failing firm defense, these elements have a direct
effect on antitrust regulation.186 Thus, the failing firm defense
should weigh heavily, if not exclusively, on these two elements.
These two elements are essential to the failing firm defense
because they help focus the defense on protecting competition
rather than protecting anticompetitive transactions involving
firms in financial distress.
1.

The Importance of the Alternative Purchaser Requirement

The requirement to make a good-faith effort to find an
alternative purchaser protects against the loss of competition.187
If an alternative purchaser could be interested, “a unit in the
competitive system would be preserved and not lost to monopoly
power.”188 The main way the alternative purchaser requirement
protects against the loss of competition is by rejecting market
power premiums.
The alternative purchaser requirement protects against
“market power premiums.” A market power premium is “a
payment for anticipated gains in market power.”189
“An
acquiring company willing to pay a market power premium [is]
betting on higher prices from increased concentration through
oligopolistic interdependence . . . .”190 Competitor-purchasers will
likely argue that they are willing to pay a higher premium
because it is actually an efficiency premium.191 Some of these
offers may include efficiency premiums, but it is difficult to
separate a market power premium from an efficiency premium.192
Although the alternative purchaser requirement may block some
mergers that could potentially lead to efficiencies, conventional

185

2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 32.
See supra Part II.C–D.
187
See Correia, supra note 36, at 693.
188
Citizen Publ’g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1969).
189
Correia, supra note 36, at 694.
190
Id. An “oligopoly” is “a market situation in which each of a few producers
affects but does not control the market.” Oligopoly Definition, MERRIAMWEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/oligopolistic (last visited
Feb. 9, 2012).
191
See Correia, supra note 36, at 694.
192
See William Blumenthal, Thirty-One Merger Policy Questions Still Lingering
After the 1992 Guidelines, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 593, 638 (1993).
186
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merger analysis is based on “probabilities, not certainties.”193
Thus, even a significant risk of interdependence warrants
blocking a merger.
2.

The Importance of the Assets-Exiting-the-Relevant-Market
Requirement

The requirement that the allegedly failing firm’s assets will
exit the relevant market absent the acquisition is the best
protection against the loss of competition. This is a difficult
requirement to meet because “impending [financial] failure does
not necessarily mean that the firm would in fact disappear from
the market without the particular merger in question.”194 This is
because a firm “might survive bankruptcy reorganization with
little or no durable loss in market position, or it might be
purchased by outside interests that would preserve or even
enhance its competitive impact, particularly if the outside
interests purchased it at a lower price than its current burden of
debt.”195 In looking at whether a firm will exit the relevant
market, Antitrust Regulators should consider whether a firm can
pay its obligations in the near future and reorganize in
bankruptcy. Although Antitrust Regulators should consider the
bankruptcy elements when determining whether the assetsexiting-the-relevant-market requirement is met, they are not
necessary to prove the new defense.
Under this requirement, the assets should be certain to exit
the relevant market. The acquisition of assets by a leading firm
would raise antitrust concerns “[i]f those assets could be expected
to remain in the market in some other hands—either a somehow
rejuvenated original firm, a new firm, or even a firm with a
smaller market share.”196 “But if the assets of the failing firm
would otherwise leave the market, the effect of the acquisition is
to increase capacity in the market relative to the alternative of
exit.”197 This is important because antitrust law would prefer the
assets to stay in the relevant market in any capacity, rather than
to allow an anticompetitive merger.

193
194
195
196
197

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962).
See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 275.
See id. at 275–76.
Kwoka & Warren-Boulton, supra note 14, at 445.
Id. at 445 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Requiring exit from the relevant market is also a bright line
rule that may avoid some of the confusion associated with the
failing firm defense. Because the failing firm defense is a narrow
exception, complete exit from the market would be the most
drastic and least plausible scenario.198 If some assets were able
to stay in the relevant market in any way, then the failing firm
defense should not be applicable at all. Thus, a bright line rule
that requires complete collapse is probably more predictable than
slow decline and future estimates.199
D. Revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines
The current failing firm defense should be abolished, and the
new “Assets Exiting Defense” premised upon a two-prong
analysis should be incorporated into the Guidelines:
Section 11: Exiting Assets
A merger is not likely to create or enhance market power or
facilitate its exercise if the following circumstances are met by
the target firm:
(1) it has made unsuccessful good-faith efforts to elicit
reasonable alternative offers of acquisition of the assets that
would both keep tangible and intangible assets in the relevant
market and pose a less severe danger to competition than does
the proposed merger, and
(2) absent the acquisition, its assets would exit the relevant
market.

CONCLUSION
The failing firm defense has been firmly embedded in
antitrust law since its creation in International Shoe in 1930.
The defense should focus exclusively on antitrust principles and
not become an escape hatch for anticompetitive transactions of
firms that are in financial distress. The purpose of the failing
firm defense should be to protect competition, not to protect firms
from failing in a distressed economy. A stronger “Assets Exiting
Defense” would ensure that Antitrust Regulators do not apply
the defense too broadly and refocus the current failing firm
defense on its original purpose, to protect competition.

198
199

See Correia, supra note 36, at 686, 689.
See id. at 689.

